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APPELLANT IS INCARCERATED 
Criminal No. 101500382 
Appellate Case No. 20100950 
Judge: G. Michael Westfall 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal comes under the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, §78A-4-103 (l)(2)(e) (1953, as amended) in that it involves an appeal from a 
court of record in a criminal case which does not involve a conviction of a capital or first degree 
felony. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Issues that were considered for appeal in this case by Counsel for Appellant include the 
following: 
ISSUE No. 1: Whether or not the Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel or 
if there was prosecutorial misconduct under the circumstances? 
ISSUE No. 2: Whether or not Appellant may challenge the plea agreement when he did 
not give notice or file a motion to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing? 
ISSUE No. 3: Whether or not the trial court erred or abused its discretion in sentencing 
the Appellant to prison under the circumstances of this case? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is believed to be one of "correctness" as it applies to questions of law and 
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the interpretation of statute. It is a standard of "clearly erroneous" as it applies to questions of 
fact. See State v. Ramirez, 1817 P.2d 774 and State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah App 1991); 
see also State v. Gibbons, 770 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989) and State v. Gerrard, 574 P.2d 885 (Utah 
1978). The trial court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably. See State v. Commer, 2002 UT 
App. 219 at 111, 51 P.3d 55 (quoting State v. Whittel 1999 UT 96, at paragraph 20, 989 P.2d 52) 
cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). The Court of Appeals accords no deference to the legal 
conclusions of the trial court but reviews them for correctness. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, at 18, 
20 P.3d 300. 
Sentencing, being indeterminate in the State of Utah, falls to the substantial discretion of 
the trial court judge. See State v. Smith, 842 P.2d 908 (Utah 1992). Moreover, the exercise of 
that discretion is not unlimited and it may not be exercised on the basis of unreliable information. 
See State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985). It is an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to 
withdraw plea if the Appellant did not have full knowledge and understanding of the 
circumstances of his plea. See State v. Valsilacupulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App) cert, denied, 765 
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
Regarding a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court reviews for correctness 
the trial court's application of law to the facts. Id. It defers to the trial court's factual 
determination unless clearly erroneous but remains free to make an independent determination of 
a trial court's legal conclusions. See State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14 at f 37. The right to counsel 
embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution is a right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. A defendant is deprived of this right when his counsel's conduct so 
undermines the proper function of the adversarial process that the proceedings cannot be relied 
on in having produced a just result. Ineffective assistance of counsel is proven when performance 
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is so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and except for such 
deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have 
been different Id at ^[68; see also Stickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutory provisions which Appellant believes to be applicable but not decisive are as 
follows: 
Utah Code Annotated §41-6a-517, §58-37-8 and §78A-4-103 (1953, as amended), true and 
correct photocopies of the statutory provisions are attached hereto, marked as Appellant's Exhibit 
"A" and the same is incorporated herein by this reference as part of the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE of the CASE: This case concerns the Appellant, LEVI WICKWARD, who was 
pulled over in Iron County on or about the 29th day of June, 2010, for driving a vehicle travelling 
ten miles an hour above the speed limit. The officer approached the vehicle and the Appellant 
appeared to him to be nervous and would not keep his hands where the officer could see them 
after being asked several times to do so. He and his female passenger were then asked to exit the 
vehicle for the officer's safety and each consented to a search of it. 
The officer found aluminum foil, a pen that the middle had been removed, a plastic straw 
that was burnt at one end and a box containing a prescription medication bottle with no label. 
The bottle was found to contain Azepam and Oxycodone Hydrochloride. The passenger 
thereafter informed officers that the Appellant was planning on selling the medication to some 
friends in Cedar City, Utah. Several text messages from the phone of the Appellant confirmed 
this. 
Appellant also consented to testing which returned positive for THC. He was arrested and 
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charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with an intent to distribute, one 
as a second degree felony and the other a class A misdemeanor; possession of drug paraphernalia 
and driving with a measurable controlled substance in the body, each a class B misdemeanor. He 
had a prior conviction for burglary of a dwelling in 2009 in Washington County. He was 
appointed a public defender and a preliminary hearing was held on or about the 21st day of July, 
2010, where he was bound over on all counts. He was arraigned on the 3rd day of August, 2010, 
pleading not guilty and the matter was set for a one-day jury trial on the 28th day of October, 
2010. While incarcerated, on or about the 8th day of July, 2010, the Appellant was also charged 
with a third degree felony for damaging the Iron County jail in criminal case number 101500414. 
On or about the 1st day of September, 2010, the matter came before Court for a change of 
plea and the Appellant signed a Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty 
Plea and Certificate of Counsel and Order, pleading guilty to possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony and driving with a measurable controlled 
substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor. The remaining charges were dismissed, including 
those in criminal case number 101500414. This document provided notice of withdrawing his 
plea within thirty (30) days. 
The arrangement contemplated the recommendation of a presentence investigation report 
and the matter was continued for sentencing to allow for its preparation. On or about the 25th day 
of October, 2010, the Court filed its judgment, sentence and commitment after having sentenced 
the Appellant on the 5 day of October, 2010, consistent with the recommendation made by 
Adult Probation & Parole to Utah State Prison, to pay a fine in the amount of $1,000.00 and a 
court security fee of $33.00 for each count to which he pled guilty. The sentences were run 
concurrent and it was recommended to the Board of Pardons to give the Appellant credit for 99 
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days for time served in the Iron County Jail. No notice or motion to withdraw the Appellant's 
plea was filed with the court or asserted at sentencing or thereafter. 
A notice of appeal was filed on or about the 23rd day of November, 2010, his appointed 
attorney ait trial thereafter withdrawing and indicating that he had notified Appellant of his right 
to motion for a new trial or to seek a certificate of probable cause and that he has a right to appeal 
his case. There was not filed a motion to withdraw plea prior to sentencing or at anytime 
thereafter and the notice of appeal is not specific as to grounds for filing the same. 
COURSE of PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION: Appellant was arrested on the 29th day 
of June, 2010, when he was charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute, a second degree felony for possession of Oxycodone Hydrochloride and a 
class A misdemeanor for possessing Azepam. He was charged with possession of drug 
paraphernalia for having certain items thought to be used in connection with drug use and driving 
with a measurable controlled substance in the body for testing positive for THC, each a class B 
misdemeanor. While incarcerated on or about the 8th day of July, 2008, he was charged with a 
third degree felony for damaging the Iron Count Jail. He had a prior conviction for burglary of a 
dwelling in 2009 in Washington County, State of Utah. He was appointed a public defender and 
a preliminairy hearing was held on or about the 21st day of July, 2010, where he was bound over 
on all counts and entered a not guilty plea on or about the 3rd day of August, 2010. The matter 
was set for a one-day jury trial for the end of October. 
He appeared before the Court on the 1st day of September, 2010, and signed a statement 
of defendant in support of guilty plea and certificate of counsel and order, pleading guilty to 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony and driving 
with a measurable controlled substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor. The remaining 
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charges were dismissed. He was sentenced on the 5 day of October, 2010, and the judgment, 
sentence and commitment filed on or about the 25th day of October, 2010, the trial court having 
followed the recommendation made by Adult Probation and Parole, fining the Appellant 
$1,000.00 with a security fee of $33.00 for each count pled to, running the sentences concurrent 
and recommending credit for time served. Appellant is presently incarcerated. A Notice of 
Appeal was filed on the 23rd day of November, 2010, new counsel appointed for appeal and 
Appellant was advised of his rights to motion for a new trial or to seek a certificate of probable 
cause to appeal his case. No notice or motion to withdraw plea was made and notice of appeal 
was not specific as to grounds for filing the same. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about the 29 day of June, 2010, Michael Iverson of the Iron County Sheriffs 
Office observed a silver passenger vehicle travelling at a high rate of speed. The Officer 
conducted a stop of the vehicle and had the Appellant and his passenger exit as he felt 
uncomfortable about their nervous behavior. The passenger was the registered owner of the 
vehicle and she consented to search. See the preliminary hearing transcript at page 5, in the 
record at 6 and 7, a true and correct photocopy is attached as Appellant's Exhibit "B" of the 
Addendum and incorporated herein by this reference. 
2. A search of the vehicle turned up prescription medication which was not in a proper 
prescription bottle or under proper label. Id at page 7. The passenger indicated that she had only 
met Appellant two days prior and had overheard conversations as his talked on his cell phone 
where she believed he was arranging the sale or exchange of drugs. The Appellant had offered 
her a blue roxy pill which she reluctantly decided to take after first declining due to her own 
prescription medication addiction. See the record at 1 and 2. 
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3. The search also recovered several items that were suspicious to the searching officers. 
They found aluminum foil, a pen that the middle had been removed, a plastic straw that was 
burnt at one end and as mentioned a box containing a prescription medication bottle with no 
label. It was determined afterward that the bottle contained Oxycodone Hydrochloride and 
Azepam. See preliminary hearing transcript at page 7. Appellant consented to drug testing which 
returned positive for THC. Id at page 11. 
4. Appellant was arrested and charged with two counts of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, one a second degree felony and the other a class A 
misdemeanor; possession of drug paraphernalia and driving with a metabolite controlled 
substance in the body, each a class B misdemeanor. See the record at 4 to 7.He had a prior 
conviction for burglary of a dwelling in 2009 in Washington County. See the preliminary hearing 
transcript at page 32, in the record at 67. 
5. The Appellant was appointed a public defender and a preliminary hearing was held on 
or about the 21st day of July, 2010, he was bound over on all counts. He was arraigned on the 3rd 
day of August, 2010, pleading not guilty and the matter was set for a one-day jury trial for the 
28th day of October, 2010. See the record at 21. While incarcerated on or about the 8th day of 
July, 2010., the Appellant was also charged with a third degree felony for damaging the Iron 
County Jail in criminal case number, 101500414. 
6. On or about the 1st day of September, 2010, the matter came before the trial court in a 
change of plea and the Appellant signed a defendant in support of guilty plea and certificate of 
counsel and order, pleading guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, a second degree felony and driving with a measurable controlled substance in the 
body, a class B misdemeanor. See the record at 27 to 36, a true and correct photocopy of the plea 
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agreement is attached as Appellant's Exhibit "C" of the Addendum and incorporated herein by 
this reference. The remaining charges were dismissed, including those in criminal case number 
101500414. The plea agreement advised the Appellant of his rights and those that would be 
waived and to file written notice to withdraw his plea within thirty (30) days. A presentence 
investigation report was ordered and the matter was continue for sentencing. 
5. The Appellant was sentenced on the 5 day of October, 2010, the trial court judge 
having received and reviewed the presentence investigation report which recommended that 
Appellant be sentenced to prison per statute, one to fifteen years for the second degree felony and 
six months for the class B misdemeanor. The Court followed the recommendation, and ran the 
sentences concurrently, charging a $33.00 court security fee for each count and recommending 
that the Appellant receive credit for 99 days served in the Iron County Jail. See the sentencing 
hearing at pages 10-12, in the record at 68, a true and complete photocopy is attached as 
Appellant's Exhibit "D" of the Addendum and is incorporated herein by this reference. He was 
also ordered to pay a fine in the amount $1,000.00 including the ninety percent (90%) surcharge. 
The trial court's judgment, sentence and commitment was filed on or about the 25th day of 
October, 2010. See the record at 56-60, a true and complete photocopy is attached as Appellant's 
Exhibit "E" of the Addendum and incorporated herein by this reference. The Notice of Appeal 
was filed on or about the 23rd day of November, 2010, appointed attorney at trial thereafter 
withdrawing and indicating that he had notified Appellant of his right to motion for a new trial or 
to seek a certificate of probable cause and that he had a right to appeal his case. There was not 
filed a motion to withdraw plea prior to sentencing or at anytime thereafter. Notice of Appeal 
was not specific as to the grounds for filing the same. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Counsel for Appellant submits an Anders' brief, concluding that the appeal is non-
meritorious, finding that the record does not support a challenge to the procedure or findings of 
the trial court judge accepting the plea or at sentencing. Moreover, the record does not support a 
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel for Appellant believes the prospect of 
success on appeal unlikely in light of the fact that the record does not propose or show that 
Appellant attempted to withdraw his plea in a timely fashion and that the trial court judge did not 
abuse its discretion accepting it or following the recommendation of Adult Probation & Parole in 
sentencing the Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
SUBMISSION OF ANDERS' BRIEF PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
STATE V. WELLS, 2000 UTAH APP. 304,13 P.3D 1056 
Counsel for Appellant files this brief after the manner of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 
7838, 87 S.Ct. 1397, 1811 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), having furnished to this Court the details which 
counsel submits should be considered in the record that might arguably support an appeal. 
Counsel submits that the certificate of mailing will confirm that a copy of this brief was 
furnished to Appellant by mail after Appellant had the opportunity to discuss, review and provide 
arguments or commentary. Counsel also submits the following considered points in reaching his 
determination that the appeal of Appellant is non-meritorious. 
9 
POINT NO. 1 
THE APPEAL IS FROM THE SENTENCE OF THE APPELLANT AFTER 
ENTRY OF A GUILTY PLEA PURSUANT TO A PLEA AGREEMENT WHICH LIMITS 
THE POTENTIAL ISSUES THAT CAN BE RAISED ON APPEAL. 
The circumstances of the present case are not unusual. In fact, one might consider them to 
be a common, frequent and regular occurrence to have a Defendant enter into a plea agreement 
with some hope or expectation of favorable disposition only to be sentenced to something less 
expected and understanding his right to appeal chooses to exercise it by advising his attorney to 
file on his behalf without much explanation. In this case, counsel for Appellant did not represent 
him in the trial court proceedings. After sentencing, an appeal was filed at the request of 
Appellant. However, there was never provided a specific basis and the record and transcript of 
sentencing is devoid of any notice or motion to withdraw plea. There was prepared a statement of 
defendant in support of guilty plea and certificate of counsel and order which notified the 
Appellant of the issues, the crime and statutory provision, degree of the offense and possible 
maximum punishment of each. Elements were provided as well as a factual basis sufficient to 
support the charges to which Appellant was pleading. Sufficient explanation was offered in the 
caption of "Waiver of Constitutional Rights" setting forth boldly that in pleading guilty he was 
waiving and giving up all his statutory and constitutional rights explained therein. It was further 
explained that he only had thirty days to withdraw his plea even though he actually had up until 
sentencing. There was as a certificate of voluntariness wherein the Appellant initialed and 
acknowledged that he was entering the plea voluntarily and of his own free will and choice 
understanding it and satisfied with the advice and assistance of counsel, not under the influence of 
any drugs, medication or intoxicants that would impair his judgment and not suffering from any 
mental disability or incapacity. 
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In other words, the record in this case shows that the Appellant acknowledged that he 
read and understood the statement of defendant regarding guilty plea and that it was his desire to 
enter into the plea of guilty pursuant to the plea agreement which contemplated dismissal of the 
other remaining charges and the preparation of a presentence report. Moreover, since the matter 
did not go to trial, there is really nothing in the record that would establish or suggest ineffective 
assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. Counsel's handling of the preliminary hearing 
was responsible and appropriate. There was not filed pretrial motions. There was nothing unusual, 
extraordinary or noteworthy about the procedure in which Appellant's case was handled to 
distinguish it as being exceptional or different and particularly, the statement of defendant 
regarding guilty plea or the review of the trial court judge addressing issues of voluntariness. In 
other words, for purposes of review, the record reveals nothing that would suggest or establish a 
meritorious claim for appeal primarily because the circumstances disclose that the case was 
resolved early in the proceedings, prior to trial and a full and adequate record was made of the 
entry of the plea and the execution of the that procedure rendered mute any pending issues 
regarding the action taken by the bench or bar. In State of Utah v. Lopez, 2005 UT App 496, this 
Court ruled that pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §77-13-6(2) anytime after a defendant has 
entered a guilty plea but before a sentence is announced, a defendant may move to withdraw it. 
This is also the position taken by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68 31 P.3d 
528. Notwithstanding, it requires that a motion or notice be filed, raised or considered. Likewise, 
the Utah Supreme Court has ordered that plea agreements are binding on the parties and the court 
once the plea is entered and accepted. See State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1304 (Utah 1986). In State 
v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, this Court made clear the requirement to insure that constitutional and 
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procedural requirements of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure have been met. In this 
case, it was accomplished through a written plea agreement which is part of the record a copy is 
attached as Appellant's Exhibit "C" of the Addendum and incorporated herein by this reference. 
Use of a written affidavit signed by the defendant was addressed as an efficient means to comply 
with the strict requirements of Rule 11(e). See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Utah 
1987). The written plea agreement in this case meets this Court's requirements. 
POINT NO. 2 
REVIEW OF THE RECORD REVEALS NO BASIS FOR ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Appointed counsel provided an appropriate defense. He properly conducted the 
preliminary hearing and protected Appellant's rights at arraignment by pleading not guilty. The 
Appellant by his written agreement acknowledged that he is satisfied with the advice and services 
provided by his attorney as part of the plea. While no witnesses were called by the defense at 
preliminary hearing, it is not common to call defense witnesses at that stage of the proceedings. 
There were no pretrial motions filed or contemplated. To determine whether Appellant received 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, it must be shown that the representation fell below the 
objective standard of a reasonable professional, overcoming the presumption first that counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment; and second, 
showing that counsel's errors were prejudicial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 
104 s. ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.ed. 2d. 674 (1984). Particularly, discrepancies in trial counsel's 
performance must be obvious. In State v. Valdez, 2004 UT App 200, this Court noted that: 
Appellant review of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, otherwise, 
the distorting effects of hindsight would produce too great a temptation for courts to 
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second guess trial counsel's performance on the basis of an inanimate record (citations 
omitted). Furthermore, we will not second guess trial counsels legitimate strategic 
choices, however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect. Id at f3. 
In this case, the matter resolved without a trial. Nothing can be gleaned from the record to 
suggest counsel was ineffective or that there was misconduct on the part of the prosecution. More 
importantly, the record fails to disclose prejudicial error or indicate that the result would have 
more likely been successful had the course chosen by counsel been a different one. The court 
reviews the matter in the context of considering if the challenged act or omission might be 
considered sound trial strategy. See State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, at %8. Certainly, 
Appellant in this case obtained the benefit of having additional charges dismissed having the two 
counts he plead to run concurrently with credit for time served. There is nothing in the record to 
suggest that an alternative strategy would have been anymore sound or likely to be as successful. 
Moreover, it is impossible in this case to establish prejudicial harm since none is demonstrated in 
the record and given the fact that it has long been this Court's policy to not rely upon the general 
or conclusory statements of the Appellant. See State v. Skidmore, 2002 UT App 51 at ^8. Where 
the record is silent on such matters, this Court is not likely to speculate particularly in light of the 
fact that there was no notice or motion made to withdraw Appellant's plea of guilty. 
POINT NO. 3 
SENTENCING IN THE CASE WAS REASONABLE AND WITHIN THE BROAD 
DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO RUN CONCURRENT AND RECOMMEND 
CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. 
The trial court in this case sentenced pursuant to the recommendation made by Adult 
Probation & Parole which was also consistent with the criminal history matrix. The trial court 
judge has broad discretion in sentencing. See State v. Smith, 842 P.2d 908 (Utah 1992). 
13 
However, a trial court judge abuses its discretion if the record reveals having exercised it on the 
basis of unreliable information. See State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985). Nothing of this 
sort is indicated in the record in this case. The sentencing did not exceed statutory or 
constitutional limits and appears to have considered relevant factors. The overall sentence was 
mitigated by running the two counts concurrent and recommending to the Board of Pardons that 
Appellant be given credit for time served in the Iron County Jail. Therefore, it cannot be said that 
the trial court judge abused his discretion in sentencing the Appellant. The judgment was within 
his authority and the bounds of the charge and it does not appear to have been exercised on the 
basis of unreliable information. Therefore, this attorney believes any claim to the contrary to be 
non-meritorious. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, counsel for Appellant, having 
submitted this brief in the fashion of Anders9 as required by State v. Wells, 2000 Utah App. 304, 
13 P.3d 1056, having exercised due diligence in attempting to support Appellant's appeal to the 
best of his ability, having underwent a thorough examination of the record and transcripts in the 
case and having set forth those points and authorities disclosing a basis which might arguably 
support the appeal, having furnished the Appellant with a copy and provided him with an 
opportunity to augment or change the same, and Appellant having chosen not to do so, this 
attorney requests leave to withdraw, after the Court's review and determining that no additional 
issues could have been raised or finding that Appellant had no desire to submit a brief on his 
own. In other words, counsel for Appellant requests that action be taken by the Court of Appeals 
to either dismiss the appeal or proceed to a decision on the merits together with such other and 
14 
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-37-8 (1953, as amended). 
Prohibited Acts - Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with* intent to produce, manufacture, 
or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange 
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation 
of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert 
with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of 
organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled 
substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a 
second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first 
degree felony; 
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or 
marijuana, or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony, 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may 
be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the 
trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or 
possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in 
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may 
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree 
felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years 
and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, 
and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B -- Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance 
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or 
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional 
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, 
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be 
occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged 
prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third 
degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of 
the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a 
conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater 
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled 
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including a substance listed 
in Section 58-37-4.2, or less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, 
and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior 
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-
1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one 
degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to 
controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to 
a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not 
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in the person's 
body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, 
causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in 
Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-37-
4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA), or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third 
degree felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor. 
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious bodily injury 
or death as a result of the person's negligent driving in violation of Subsection 58-37-
8(2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise from the same episode of driving. 
(3) Prohibited acts C - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a 
license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for 
the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent 
oneself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or 
other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration 
of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be 
attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose receiving 
any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, 
alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false 
name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, 
or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under 
the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to 
print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, 
or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D ~ Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this 
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 
37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled 
Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this 
Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those 
schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds 
of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which 
are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or 
institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, 
or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act 
occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or 
distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of 
any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
(b) (i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and 
shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would 
otherwise have been established but for this Subsection (4) would have been a first 
degree felony. 
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less 
than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this 
Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that 
offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
(d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided 
by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one 
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with 
the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits, 
requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit 
a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly 
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was 
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the 
location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware 
that the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (l)(b) and (2)(c), a plea of 
guilty or no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance under Title 77, 
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has 
been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance 
agreement. 
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, 
notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this chapter. 
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu 
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, 
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a 
bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a 
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a 
controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did 
so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances. 
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of the 
veterinarian's professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be 
administered by an assistant or orderly under the veterinarian's direction and supervision. 
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses 
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a 
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of the officer's 
employment. 
(12) (a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, 
as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for 
bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional 
Indian religion as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(w). 
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in 
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used, 
possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in 
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion. 
(c) (i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense 
under this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but not later than 10 days prior to trial, 
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense. 
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause 
shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. 
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) by a 
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to 
the charges. 
(13) (a) It is an affirmative defense that the person produced, possessed, or administered a 
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if the person: 
(i) was engaged in medical research; and 
(ii) was a holder of a valid license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-
6. 
(b) It is not a defense under Subsection (13)(a) that the person prescribed or dispensed a 
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2. 
(14) It is an affirmative defense that the person possessed, in the person's body, a 
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if: 
(a) the person was the subject of medical research conducted by a holder of a valid 
license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-6; and 
(b) the substance was administered to the person by the medical researcher. 
(15) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without 
the invalid provision or application. 
(16) A legislative body of a political subdivision may not enact an ordinance that is less 
restrictive than any provision of this chapter. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6a-517 (1953, as amended). 
Definitions - Driving with any measurable controlled substance in the body -
Penalties - Arrest without warrant. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Controlled substance" has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2. 
(b) "Practitioner" has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2. 
(c) "Prescribe" has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2. 
(d) "Prescription" has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2. 
(2) In cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6a-502, a person may not operate 
or be in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state if the person has any 
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's 
body. 
(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the controlled 
substance was: 
(a) involuntarily ingested by the accused; 
(b) prescribed by a practitioner for use by the accused; or 
(c) otherwise legally ingested. 
(4) (a) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(b) A person who violates this section is subject to conviction and sentencing under both 
this section and any applicable offense under Section 58-37-8. 
(5) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section 
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in 
the officer's presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation 
was committed by the person. 
(6) The Driver License Division shall, if the person is 21 years of age or older on the date 
of arrest: 
(a) suspend, for a period of 120 days, the driver license of a person convicted under 
Subsection (2) of an offense committed on or after July 1,- 2009; or 
(b) revoke, for a period of two years, the driver license of a person if: 
(i) the person has a prior conviction as defined under Subsection 41-6a-501(2); and 
(ii) the current violation under Subsection (2) is committed on or after July 1, 2009, and 
within a period of 10 years after the date of the prior violation. 
(7) The Driver License Division shall, if the person is 19 years of age or older but under 
21 years of age on the date of arrest: 
(a) suspend, until the person is 21 years of age or for a period of one year, whichever is 
longer, the driver license of a person convicted under Subsection (2) of an offense 
committed on or after July 1, 2011; or 
(b) revoke, until the person is 21 years of age or for a period of two years, whichever is 
longer, the driver license of a person if: 
(i) the person has a prior conviction as defined under Subsection 41-6a-501(2); and 
(ii) the current violation under Subsection (2) is committed on or after July 1, 2009, and 
within a period of 10 years after the date of the prior violation. 
(8) The Driver License Division shall, if the person is under 19 years of age on the date 
of arrest: 
(a) suspend, until the person is 21 years of age, the driver .license of a person convicted 
under Subsection (2) of an offense committed on or after July 1, 2009; or 
(b) revoke, until the person is 21 years of age, the driver license of a person if: 
(i) the person has a prior conviction as defined under Subsection 41 -6a-501(2); and 
(ii) the current violation under Subsection (2) is committed on or after July 1, 2009, and 
within a period of 10 years after the date of the prior violation. 
(9) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or revocation period 
the number of days for which a license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223 
or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension was based on the Same occurrence upon which 
the record of conviction is based. 
(10) The Driver License Division shall: 
(a) deny, suspend, or revoke a person's license for the denial and suspension periods in 
effect prior to July 1, 2009, for a conviction of a violation under Subsection (2) that was 
committed prior to July 1, 2009; or 
(b) deny, suspend, or revoke the operator's license of a person for the denial, suspension, 
or revocation periods in effect from July 1, 2009, through June 30, 2011, if: 
(i) the person was 20 years of age or older but under 21 years of age at the time of arrest; 
and 
(ii) the conviction under Subsection (2) is for an offense that was committed on or after 
July 1, 2009, and prior to July 1, 2011. 
(11) A court that reported a conviction of a violation of this section for a violation that 
occurred on or after July 1, 2009, to the Driver License Division may shorten the 
suspension period imposed under Subsection (7)(a) or (8)(a) prior to completion of the 
suspension period if the person: 
(a) (i) for a license suspension imposed under Subsection (7)(a), completes at least six 
months of the license suspension; or 
(ii) for a license suspension imposed under Subsection (8)(a), completes at least two 
years of the license suspension; 
(b) completes a screening; 
(c) completes an assessment, if it is found appropriate by a screening under Subsection 
(ll)(b); 
(d) completes substance abuse treatment if it is found appropriate by the assessment 
under Subsection (1 l)(c); 
(e) completes an educational series if substance abuse treatment is not required by the 
assessment under Subsection (1 l)(c) or the court does not order substance abuse 
treatment; 
(f) has not been convicted of a violation of any motor vehicle law in which the person 
was involved as the operator of the vehicle during the suspension period imposed under 
Subsection (7)(a) or (8)(a); 
(g) has complied with all the terms of the person's probation or all orders of the court if 
not ordered to probation; and 
(h) (i) is 18 years of age or older and provides a sworn statement to the court that the 
person has not consumed a controlled substance not prescribed by a practitioner for use 
by the person or unlawfully consumed alcohol during the suspension period imposed 
under Subsection (7)(a) or (8)(a); or 
(ii) is under 18 years of age and has the person's parent or legal guardian provide an 
affidavit or other sworn statement to the court certifying that to the parent or legal 
guardian's knowledge the person has not consumed a controlled substance not prescribed 
by a practitioner for use by the person or unlawfully consumed alcohol during the 
suspension period imposed under Subsection (7)(a) or (8)(a). 
(12) If the court shortens a person's license suspension period in accordance with the 
requirements of Subsection (11), the court shall forward the order shortening the person's 
license suspension period prior to the completion of the suspension period imposed under 
Subsection (7)(a) or (8)(a) to the Driver License Division. 
(13) (a) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails to: 
(i) complete all court ordered screening and assessment, educational series, and substance 
abuse treatment; or 
(ii) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment costs. 
(b) Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend the person's driving 
privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3-221(2) and (3). 
(14) The court shall order supervised probation in accordance with Section 41-6a-507 for 
a person convicted under Subsection (2). 
Utah Code Annotated 78A-4-103 (1953, as amended). 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all 
writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, 
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other 
local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction 
or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a 
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions 
of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital 
felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not 
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, 
visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the 
court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination 
any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on July 21, 2010) 
3 THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Levi Wickward, case 
4 No. 101500381. 
5 MR. BURNS: Good morning. 
6 MS. ALLEN: Your Honor, I'm going to be calling Officer 
7 Iverson first. 
8 THE COURT: Your other witnesses? 
9 MS. ALLEN: Possibly Tenille Turner. 
10 (Counsel conferring off the record) 
11 MS. ALLEN: With regard to the 382 case, it's going to 
12 be Officer Iverson, Tenille Turner and possibly Nic Gibson. 
13 THE COURT: Well, we're going to proceed with the 381 
14 case first. Who are you going to call in that case? 
15 MS. ALLEN: The 381 case is Mr. Slack's case. 
16 THE COURT: Oh, all right. Well, then let's proceed 
17 with the 382 case. Officer Iverson, Tenille Turner and who 
18 else, Counsel? 
19 MS. ALLEN: Possibly Nic Johnson. Sorry, I mis-spoke 
20 before. It was Nic Johnson. 
21 THE COURT: All right. If each of the witness would 
22 please stand, raise their right hands and take the oath. Is 
23 Ms. Turner present? 
24 MS,. ALLEN: She is, your Honor. 




























hand and take the oath, please. 
COURT CLERK: Do you and each of you solemnly 




the truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
(Witnesses affirm the oath) 
COURT CLERK: Thank you. 
MS. ALLEN: Officer Iverson first, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Officer, if you'll come forward 
and take a seat, please. 
MR. BURNS: Your Honor, we would like to invoke the 
exclusionary rule at this time. 
THE COURT: All right, if the other witnesses would 
remove themselves, please, from the courtroom, not discuss 





having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
ALLEN: 
Officer Iverson, you are a deputy with the Iron County 







































All right, and on the date of June 29th, 2010 were you 
as a peace officer here in Iron County? 
Yes, ma'am. 
Can you tell us how you came to have contact with Mr. 
kward? 
Yes, I was stationary on the freewayc just south of 












nd. I radared him -- my radar, my visual (inaudible) 
miles an hour. So I conducted a traffic stop on the 
and that's how we made contact. 
Okay, and was he the driver of that vehicle? 
Yes, ma'am. 
Is he seated here at Counsel table next to Mr. Burns? 
Yes, ma'am. 
All right. All right, after you conducted the traffic 
d you begin engaging the driver in a conversation? 
I approached the vehicle from the passenger's side, 
officer safety reasons. As I approached the vehicle, 
the passenger Tenille and the driver were going through paper-
work. Their hands were going everywhere. I asked the driver 
and the 




passenger to show me their hands, and asked the driver 
is hands on the wheel. I asked him what was going on, 
ey were going. They said to St. George to a softball 
something. 




































Or to Cedar City. 
Okay. 
I apologize, to Cedar City f 
Mr. Wickward, said that -- I 
He said he can't find it. 
or 
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a Softball game. The 
asked him 
He 
again. That seemed suspicious 
- they put off a nervous vibe 
Uh-huh. 
So I had the driver exit the 





side and escorted Mr. Wickwa 
Okay, and at some point did 
Wickward and the vehicle? 
Yes, ma'am, I asked -- first 
he had anything illegal, or any drugs 
the vehicle. Mr. Wickward said that 






for his driver's 





rd out of 
and the behavior 
you could call 
I actually had 
I went to the 
the vehicle. 
you gain consent to search 
I asked Mr. Wickward if 
or anything like that in 
he 
Id search the vehicle. He said, 
time Deputy Quinn Averett and 
with the passenger, Tenille -
Uh-huh. 
— and Officer Averett came 
gave consent to search the vehicle. 
Q. 
occasion 









t6 find some pills in the possession c 
I asked him 
not my car." 
Johnson were 
said that she 
id you have 
f Mr. Wickward? 
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1 A. At the time-- I didn't find any pills on Mr. Wickward. 
2 I asked him -- all I did was a quick Terry frisk for weapons — 
3 Q. Uh-huh. 
4 A. on his person, asked him if he had anything on him. 
5 He said, vvNo." As far as the inside of the vehicle goes, we 
6 found aluminum foil, some straws that looked like they might 
7 be used for smoking, a pan that was gutted out, which kind of 
8 matched, you know, the story later on. 
9 Then what else, we found some tinfoil in a box that 
10 was taped up, wrapped up, and when I shook it I couldn't hear 
11 any noise, so it seemed empty to me. At that time Mr. Wickward 
12 was talking to Deputy Averett and Deputy Johnson; and he said 
13 has prescription medication that he has a prescription for. 
14 They asked him where it was-- this was coming from the deputies 
15 --and they said that -- or he told them it was in that package. 
16 Q. Okay, so in fact did you ultimately open it and 
17 discovery some pills in the package? 
18 A. Yes, we opened the package and we discovered a green 
19 prescription bottle. 
20 Q. Uh-huh. 
21 A. It had a paper towel stuffed inside, and the pills 
22 were down at the bottom. It looked like he put it in there so 
23 they wouldn't shake and make noise when you shook the box. It 
24 was also covered in bubble wrap. 














































And the sticker was ripped off the prescription 
Did the defendant admit to you that those were Oxy-
and Diazepam? 
He said they were oxy's, which was Oxycodone, and --
Uh-huh. 
-- I think the other one he said they were Valium --
Okay. 
-- which I think is the Diazepam. 
All right, and did you -- did you also have occasion 
McKell Cantenia, the trained lab technician at the 
fs department ID those pills? 
Yes, I logged them into evidence, and she — she also 
it. 
What did she ID those pills as? 
As Diazepam and Oxycodone. 
MR. BURNS: Your Honor, I'm going to object on the 
f hearsay. 
THE COURT: Ms. Allen? 
MS. ALLEN: Your Honor, we're talking about a lab 
The rule specifically allows the admission of lab 
in preliminary hearings. She's — 
THE COURT: Isn't that right, Mr. Burns? 
MF\. BURNS: That --
THfe COURT: Under Rule 1102? 
-9-
1 MR. BURNS: That's correct, but we're not talking about 
2 lab results. We're talking about a statement made from some-
3 body to somebody else about lab results. 
4 THE COURT: Does Rule 11 --
5 MR. BURNS: That's another level of hearsay. 
6 THE COURT: Does Rule 1102 distinguish between test 
7 results that are orally recorded versus those that are reported 
8 in writing? 
\9 MR. BURNS: Your Honor, I can't recall. My recollection 
10 is that reports can be -- can be submitted at preliminary 
11 hearing, and basically subverted to get around the hearsay 
12 rule. 
13 THE COURT: Is there not a written report, Ms. Allen? 
14 MS. ALLEN: There is, your Honor, but I'm just laying 
15 the foundation for that at this point. 
16 THE COURT: All right, then the objection is sustained. 
17 MS. ALLEN: I don't — I don't know, your Honor, that 
18 the -- that it distinguishes between written and oral> -Is that 
19 something that the Court has addressed? 
20 THE COURT: Do you want to tell me what the rule says? 
21 MS. ALLEN: I don't have access to my book, but I could 
22 look at it, I suppose. 
23 THE COURT: Are you going to offer the written reports? 
24 MS. ALLEN: I intend to do that right now. 















































ALLEN: Okay. All right. 
MS. ALLEN: This is the report that 





right. I would -- I would offer those, your 
Burns has seen those. 
BURNS: Your Honor — 
COURT: Mr. Burns, any objection? 
BURNS: Your Honor, I'm looking for 
have seen them. No, your Honor, I 
COURT: And the reports — 
ALLEN: I'11 mark --
COURT: -- is it one report or two? 
ALLEN: It's one. I can — I can -
have two copies of them, but just in case 









COURT: The report is received as State' 








MS. ALLEN: All right, the package that 
contained in — well, first; of all, 
that Oxycodone is a schedule one or 




t have any 
don't know 
11 paperclip 
s Exhibit 1. 
you found J 
me ask, is 
controlled 























































Okay, that's all right. 
Schedule two is the Oxycodone. \ 
All right, and is it also the case that Diazepam is a 
four controlled substance? 
Yes, it is. 
All right. The package that you found the pills in, 
e case that it was a mailing box, or can you describe 
all? 
It was a cardboard box I'd say about twelve inches by 
hes. It was all taped up. I didn't see any postage on 
ything like that, as far as that goes; but it was all 
and sealed up, like it was getting ready to be mailed. 
Okay, all right, did the defendant make any statements 
ard to intending to mail the package at all? 
The defendant did not. 
Okay. Did you -- did law enforcement have occasion to 
i urine sample from Mr. Wickward? 
His parole officer took the urine sample. 
Okay, and was it field tested? 
Yes, it was. 
Did it test positive for THC, among other substances? 

































Did you indicate that he was the driver 




Okay, with regard to the distribution elements, did 
and we're going to hear from Ms. Turner about that 















Yes, I also have a letter from him from 
for his cell phone back. 
Okay, but you did seize his cell phone? 
Yes, ma'am. 
Did you find various admissions from the 
Wickward? 
the jail, i 
defendant on 
11 phone that led you to conclude that he was engaged, or 
ing to engage in some distribution efforts? 
MR. BURNS: Objection, leading. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I did find some --
THE COURT: Just a second, Officer. How 
t suggest an answer, Mr. Burns? 
MR. BURNS: It-- basically it's eliciting 
very statement that I think is --
THE COURT: I think it doesn't suggest an 
what the question does is point the officer 
f questioning, which I don't think is inapp 
k it merely helps us get to the evidence qu 
is it leading; 
the "testimony 
answer. So I I 
to a specific 
ropriate. 
icker, and 
it's; not leading, because it didn't suggest an answer. 





































MS. ALLEN: Okay. 
with the text. 
BY MS. ALLEN: Th 
Yes, ma'am. 
All right, we ma 
dmissions from the 
Your Honor, if I ma 
is is your only copy, 
y need to share these 
-13-
y approach with 
isn't it? 
So did you 
defendant's -- the defendant on those | 
that suggest his intentions with regard 
Yes, ma'am. 
Could you share 
served them? 
Yes, ma'am. One 









is is from him. 
From --
with us some of those 
is from Dopey Dopey, 
to those pills? ! 
admissions as 
which is on his 
man --xv or sorry, this is from Gus C, 
Or sorry, from Mr. Wickward to Gus C. 
hat's up? You took 
but the extra $35 
all the money I had. 
doubt 
filled 
It says, "Hey, 
not only one of my best friend's 
I put --NV or sorry, NV 
I am giving you the 
and hope you make things right with me. 
and took care of i 





That would have 
ou arrested him? 
Ilet' s see. 
You've previousl 
t. You're just going 
June 2 9th. 
— that was June 29th, 
y testified that you 
35 I put in; 
benefit of the 
I got my script 
to have to make 
the same day 
arrested him on 
-14-
1 June 29th, 2010. 
2 A. On 6/29, 2000 -- I'm sorry, yes, ma'am. 
3 Q. No, no, okay. All right, and your -- that text, is 
4 it the case that that was sent around what time? It indicates 
5 there on the text. 
6 A. At 6:21 p.m. 
7 Q. Okay, and is it the case that you stopped him at 
8 around 7:05 p.m? 
9 A. I believe so, ma'am, yes. 
10 Q. Okay, and talk to us about the text that specifically 
11 refers to having some pills for sale. 
12 A. It says, "Well, that depends. If you buy more than 
13 15 I will -- this once. I'm not having any problem with 12.50. 
14 I've got Roxys and Valiums I need to get rid of. I left two 
15 Roxys and two Valiums." This is -- the "I've got Roxys and 
16 Valiums I need to get rid of" was sent to Mark 0 on 5 -- at 
17 5:57 p.m., Tuesday, June 29th. 
18 Q. Okay. You can -- hold up, just a second. 
19 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
20 Q. BY MS. ALLEN: Okay, so — so could you repeat that one 
21 and tell us the time? 
22 A. It says, "I've got Roxys and Valiums I need to get rid 
23 of." He sent that at 5:57 p.m. Tuesday, June 29ch. 
24 Q. All right, and that was sent from Mr. Wickward's cell 
25 phone? 
-15-
1 A. Yes, ma'am. 
2 Q. All right. How about this one from another individual 
3 to Mr. Wickward? 
4 A. That's from Dopey Dopey to Mr. Wickward. 
5 THE COURT: Wouldn't that be hearsay, Ms. Allen? It's 
6 not the defendant's statement. 
7 MS. ALLEN: Your Honor, I would -- I would indicate 
8 that it just -- it's not being offered to prove the truth 
9 of the matter asserted, but only to indicate the intent of 
10 Mr. Wickward with regard to his medication. 
11 THE COURT: Are you suggesting that someone else's 
12 statement can be used to establish the intent of the defendant? 
13 MS. ALLEN: No, no. What I mean is, it's in the context 
14 of their exchange, it just provides some --
15 THE COURT: If you want to offer it — 
16 MS. ALLEN: — foundation for it. 
17 THE COURT: -- just to put the defendant's response in 
18 context, and not have it received for the truth of the matter 
19 asserted, we can do that. 
20 MS. ALLEN: That's what I — that's what I intend to 
21 do. 
22 THE COURT: All right. 
23 Q. BY MS. ALLEN: Okay, so if you could just indicate this 
24 -- this on^ e here. 
25 A. It says, "Hey, will you front me some until tomorrow?" 
-16-
1 This is from Dopey Dopey. 
2 Q. Was that sent — was that received after the one about 
3 ''I've got Roxys and Valiums I need to get rid of"? 
4 A. Yes, ma'am. 
5 Q. Okay, another statement with regard to the defendant, 
6 another text from his phone, could you -- could you read that? 
7 A. It says, XVI left two Roxys and two Valiums." 
8 Q. Okay, and this was sent to? 
9 A. Dopey Dopey at 5:57 p.m. 
10 Q. Okay. All right, and then -- okay, was there another 
11 one that you wanted to call to our attention? 
12 A. Yes, it's this one of Mark. 
13 Q. Was there another text again from another individual 
14 but to provide context for a response? 
15 A. Yes, it's -- this one's from Mark 0, and it's to 
16 Mr. Wickward, "I know you're -- I know who you are. This 
17 is Mark's buddy, Justin. I'll get some of -- some if I can 
18 get them for $10 a piece, because --xv or sorry, "10 a piece, 
19 because 12.50 is too much." 
20 Q. Okay. 
21 A. This was sent at -- I'm not sure the time. It shows 
22 it on yours. 
2 3 Q. At 6:04 p . m . ; i s t h a t r i g h t ? 
24 A. Yfes, ma'am. 
25 Q. I'm going to have you retain those. Okay, at some 
1 point did — was the defendant taken into custody for this 
2 conduct? 
3 A. Yes, ma'am. 
4 Q. All right, and was he booked into the jail? 
5 A. Yes, ma'am. 
6 Q. Without going into all the details of the jail, d 
7 was a strip search conducted on him at that jail? 
8 A. I believe so, ma'am. 
9 Q. Okay, and did additional packages of pills fall f 
10 his underwear when he was being strip searched? 
11 MR. BURNS: Objection, foundation. I don't know t 
12 he was present. I don't know what the foundation for this 
13 question is. 
14 THE COURT: Were you present, Officer? 
15 THE WITNESS: No, sir. 
16 THE COURT: All right, sustained as to foundation. 
17 Q. BY MS. ALLEN: All right. Do you know whether an 
18 officer strip searched him? 
19 A. Yes, ma'am. 
20 Q. Do you know who that officer would have been? 
21 A. I believe Corporal Johnson and this officer here. 
22 don't know his name. 
23 Q. Is that Officer Inglested? 
24 A. Ihglested. 
25 Q. Ail right. 
-18-
1 A. I apologize. 
2 Q. Did they relate to you whether or not some pills had 
3 fallen from his underwear when he was strip searched? 
4 A. Yes, ma'am. 
5 Q. Okay, and did -- did they relate to you that those 
6 matched the pills that you also found in his vehicle? 
7 A. Yes, they did. 
8 Q. Did they also relate to you that he admitted that 
9 those were also Roxy's and Valiums, or Diazepam? 
10 A. Yes, ma' am. 
11 MS. ALLEN: Okay, and I'll -- I'll submit results when 
12 we have that hearing, your Honor. Let me just see if there's 
13 anything else. 
14 Q. BY MS. ALLEN: The other items you talked about in 
15 the car, the sawed off pen and that sort of thing, talk to us 
16 specifically about what you identified as drug paraphernalia. 
17 A. I believe the pen that was gutted out, it was burnt on 
18 one side — 
19 Q. Uh-huh. 
20 A. -- and then there was also a straw. 
21 Q. What was it about that pen that you identified as drug 
22 paraphernalia? 
23 A. That it was burnt on one side, I know, from my exper-
24 ience, whalt I've been taught, and drugs at POST, that people 








 P ipe. 
MS. ALLEN: 








Okay. I think that' s all my 
Mr. Burns, cross examination? 
Thank you. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
Good morning, Officer. 
Good morning. 
Based upon 









your testimony, it's 
icle for speeding on 
? Then subsequent to 
consent to search the vehicle? 
Yes, sir. 
Why did yo 
Because of 





u ask for consent to 
their reactions and 
I asked the driver -




license normally re 
normally aak --
A. Ye's, I ask 
-19 
questions for 
my understanding that 




, you asked 
e vehicle? 
their nervous behavior 
- I asked 
under th 
was looking for his driver's 1 
isn't a driver's lie 
quired during a traff 
him for it. Instead 




































seat, I say, "Don't worry 
Okay, you just stated 
What were they reacting to; do 
A. 
paper. 




due to their 
you know? 
going through her 
So I did that unfamiliar -- or that's not 










Then the driver, like I 
to keep his hands on the 







's going through their 
I had to ask 
When I pull 
him several 
ed him out of 
k at the vehicle several times, 
is usually an indicator that th 
e. 
Okay, and it was based 
for consent to search? 
Yes, sir. 
Okay. You stated that 
actually let me go to the -- th 









rst time, what was that -
It was on the freeway, 
ted. 
Okay, was it after his 
It was -- yes, sir, it 
• 
When was it after the 







ere's something in the 
that conduct 
- that you --











fter the consent to 
consent to search? 



































to him about the medi 
nd of conducted that. 
So upon his consent 
he on the side of the 
He was standing --
Up on the vehicle? 
-- behind the vehicl 
of asking for consent 
overheard me and said 













he gave us consent to 
— the prescription medi 
-21-
cation. 
I was talking to the witness. 
to search, what -- where 
road? 
e with me. When I was in 
to search, Quinn Averett, 
that the owner of the ve 
ger, which I found out at 
search the vehicle. 
Okay, so upon -- upon receiving consent, you 
y with Mr. Wickward or 
Oh, yes, I walked up 
kward. For officer sa 
vehicle. 
Okay. 
I talked to him for 
nd things like that. 
--
to the front of the car 









several minutes about whe^ re he was 
Who conducted the search? 
I came back to -help 
So he searched on th 
the driver's side. 
Q. 
prescri 
Okay, and during the 
ption medication? 
Corporal Johnson conduct 
e passenger side, I searc 
the 
hed on 




I found a box. I didn't find the prescription medi-
I found the box. When the other deputies interviewed 







Okay. Do you know if Mr. Wickward was given his 
rights any time during this process? 
As far as I know, I didn't give him Miranda because 
around him. I was with Tenille most of the time. 
Okay. 
So I think when he went into custody, I'm sure Deputy 
















Okay. Did you hear Corporal Johnson read him his 
rights? 
I haven't -- I didn't hear Miranda rights read at that 
Did Corporal Johnson later relate to you that he was 
Miranda rights? 
No, he did not. 
Okay. Do you know if my client made any statements 
g the prescription medications in the car? 
I'm sorry? 
Did he claim the prescription medication? Did he say 
y were his? 
Yds, he said that's where he keeps them is in — his 































to help out with his medical needs. 
Okay, and did he indicate that they 
7 
Yes. 
Okay. During your investigation in 
you run any DOPL or Division of Occupational 
-23-
were prescribed 
this matter have 
Professional 











No, I did not. 
Okay. You also stated that during 
p. So you searched the vehicle. At w 
my client? 
After we opened up the package, Dep 
package and saw that the prescription 
off, indicating that he was going to 
e said that he was shipping that box. 
ough the post office in St. George to 






to place him under arrest. 
your -- well, let's 
hat time did you 
uty Averett opened 
had a sticker 
distribute --
He tried to ship 
that -- because of 
or sorry, probable 
Okay, was there -- do you know if there was a 72 hour 
ion hold involved --
I do not know. 
-- on this arrest? Okay, and so as 
concerned ait that point in time you arrested 
far as you're 
him for possession 





































Okay. You also stated that you, when searching 
found a cell phone; is that accurate? 
I don't recall when they had the cell phone, I 
- it might have been on Levi's possession, but I 
percent sure. 
Q. So you don't know where the cell 
was on his person or in the car? 
























' m not 
phone came from, if \ 
I'd have to refer to 
s cell phone? 
Because he asked me if he could use it when he 
from it in the car, saying that he was in handcu 
vehicle -- in the vehicle he asked if he could 
make a phone call. 
Okay, and it was that phone that 
Yes, sir. 
Why are you certain of that? 
Because.this is the phone that we 
t in his car — in his pocket behi 
Okay. So you then transported --
transported my client back to the 
I did not transport him. Corpora 
st4yed there until the vehicle got 
Okay, who -- who received or who 
he was using? 
took from him 








1 Johnson transported 
impounded. 































I kept -- yes, sir, I kept the evidence. 
Okay. Let's talk about the jail. You talked about 
some prescription medication in my client's underwear at the 







y with other officers; is that correct? 
Yes, sir. 
Who did you have that conversation with? 
Corporal Johnson and Deputy Inglested asked me for 
of it when he got here. 
Is it your understanding that the -- that those --




f my client? 
I believe so, yes, sir. 
Okay. Is it your understand -- do you know if when 











That's what I was told, sir, yes. 
Okay. Do you know whether he was wearing his under-
the time or not, when they were found? 
I did not check, sir. 
You don't know the answer to that? 
No, sir. 
Hid you booked people into the jail before? 
Yes, sir. 
-26-
1 Q. Do you know what they do with their clothing? 
2 A. I didn't get to that process, no, sir. 
3 Q. Okay, do you know if the clothing was held in their 
4 personal property? 
5 A. I believe that's what they do with the clothes, sir. 
6 Q. Would that include the underwear? 
7 A. I'm --
8 Q. Do you know? 
\9 A. — not 100 percent sure; but I would assume so. 
10 Q. Okay, when did you — Ms. Allen has handed you some 
11 pictures of text messages that it was your testimony that you 
12 — you pulled off the phone. 
13 A. Yes, sir. 
14 Q. Is that — okay. When did you -- when did you look at 
15 or retrieve those messages? 
16 A. This morning before I -- before I got here. 
17 Q. Okay. Did you go through the phone and retrieve them 
18 anytime before that? 
19 A. No, sir. 
20 Q. Did you receive a warrant to go through the phone? 
21 A. No, sir. 
22 Q. Okay, and where was the phone being held? 
23 A. In evidence. 
24 MR. BURNS: Okay. I have nothing further, your Honor. 






























MS. ALLEN: Just a couple things, your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
ALLEN: i 
With regard to the searching and the phone, just 
illy, because we're not at a suppression hearing, is -- i 
were you aware that Mr. Wickward was on supervised probation 









Did you contact Alan Julian with AP&P when you were on 
working with Mr. Wickward? 
Yes, ma'am. 
Did Mr. Julian give you permission and work with you 
» search of Mr. Wickward's phone and other locations? 
Yes, he initially worked with Deputy Quinn Averett on 
it. Deputy Quinn Averett relayed the messages to me. 
Q. Okay. All right, the — when we talk about THC being 
present in his urine, are -- are we referring to a marijuana 




I would assume so. 
Okay, and then the -- the pills seized from the under-
when I spoke with you about that, you indicated that you 




Yjes, ma' am. 


































get some ID on quantity? 
Yes, I do. 
(Counsel conferring off the record) 
Is this a picture of the pills that were seized from 
derwear? 
I believe so. 
MS. ALLEN: I would move to mark this as an exhibit, 
Dnor, or at least have the Court look at it. 
THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Burns? 
MR. BURNS: Yes, your Honor. I don't believe that 
—
 xxhe believes so/' it doesn't sound -- foundation. 









THE COURT: All right, sustained. 
BY MS. ALLEN: Do you know what this is a picture of? 
Yes, ma'am. 
What is it a picture of? 
Those are prescription medications. 
Were these the pills that were found in the underwear 
defendant? 
Yes, ma'am. 1 
THE COURT: Who took the photograph, Deputy? 
THE WITNESS: I do not know, your Honor. 
THE COURT: How do you know it was taken of the medi-
that you've been referring to on the 29:" or 30lh of June? 





























stated this was the medication that came out of --
THE COURT: Told you that? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Burns? 
MR. BURNS: No objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Then the photograph is received as State's 
2 . 
(Exhibit No. 2 received into evidence) 
MS. ALLEN: You're going to give us these back, aren't 
you, ]ust in case --
Q. 
THE COURT: (No verbal response). 
BY MS. ALLEN: Mr. Burns talked to you about those 













prior to this morning to at least view those on the 
Yes, I did. 
All right, and is it the case that you and the other 
viewed those on the phone at the scene? 
Deputy Quinn Averett viewed these --
Okay. 
-- texts at the scene. 
All right. 
He did -- he did show me one. I think it was the 
-4-xv "I've just filled my script." 













































Are you finished with th 
(No verbal response). 
I think that's all my qu 
Just one. 
Mr. Burns? 
Just one followup. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
what you just stated, it 













at, your H< 
estions. 




on the roadside? 
ogize for the misunderstanding. It 
scene. We consider that 

















er he was already booked 
there to -- to talk with 
They talked about it. 
and seizure clause on his 





I was walking in with Tenille. 
y, so i 
was at 
at the scene, as 
the text, < and now 
that-in relation 




e text and 






1 Mr. Averett speaking with Adult Probation and Parole? 
2 A. It was at the same time, yes, sir. 
3 Q. Is that Alan Julian you spoke with; was that your 
4 testimony? 
5 A. I believe that was his name, yes, sir. 
6 MR. BURNS: Okay. All right, thank you. 
7 THE COURT: You can step down, Deputy. 
8 MS. ALLEN: Let me go get Ms. Turner. 
9 THE COURT: Ms. Allen, why — what would — for what 
10 purpose would you be calling Ms. Turner? 
11 MS. ALLEN: Your Honor, she can testify to the box. 
12 They went and tried to mail this box with pills in it. I have 
13 a sworn preliminary hearing statement that she's -- actually 
14 has now, ^ which I was going to simply submit to the Court; and 
15 then if the Court wanted further clarification I could call 
16 her, but I will file that witness statement. 
17 THE COURT: Didn't the deputy already testify that that 
18 is what he was told by this witness; and I don't believe that 
19 was objected to, was it? 
20 MR. BURNS: It wasn't, but it's because I knew the 
21 witness was here. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
23 MR. BURNS: But no, your Honor, it wasn't. 
24 MS. ALLEN: Let me -- I can just get -- the witness 
























THE COURT: What would you like to do, Mr 
you like to hear from the witness? 
MR. BURNS: Actually, may I approach? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Discussion at the bench off the record) 
THE COURT: Do you rest, Ms. Allen? 
MS. ALLEN: I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any evidence from the defense 
Mr. Burns? 
MR. BURNS: No, your Honor, we'll submit. 
THE COURT: All right, no argument? 
MR. BURNS: No, we will submit. 
THE COURT: Court finds, then, that there 
cause to find that Mr. Woodward committed the off* 
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which he is charged, to the sufficient quantum required to bind 
him over, and therefore orders Mr. Wickward bound over on all 
four charges contained within the Information in the 382 case. 
How would you like to handle arraignment 
MR. BURNS: Your Honor, we'd like to come 
an arraignment in this matter on August 3rd. 
THE COURT: All right, arraignment August 
MR. BURNS: Thank you. 
(Hearing concluded) 
, Mrr Burns? 
back and have 
3rd at 1:30. 
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SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA AND 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL, and 
ORDER 
Criminal No. 101500382 
Judge G. Michael Westfall 
I, LEVI WICKWARD, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and that 
I understand the following facts and rights: 
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES 
I am pleading guilty to the following crimes: 
A. 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
Degree 
POSSESSION OF A 2nd Degree Felony 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 





1-15 yrs/ $10,000 fine, 
plus a 90% surcharge, 
and a $33 court security 
fee. 
SCANNED 000027 
B. DRIVING WITH Class B Misdemeanor 
MEASURABLE CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE IN THE BODY, 
UCA§41-6a-517 
6 months/$1,000 fine, 
plus a 90% surcharge, 
and a $33 court security 
fee. 
Initials 
I have received a copy of the Information against me. I have read it, or had it read to me, and 
I understand the nature and the elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty. 
Initials 
The elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty are: 
COUNT 1: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a second degree fe lony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(l)(a)(iii), as follows: That on 
or about June 29, 2010, in Iron County, State of Utah, I did 
knowingly and intentionally possess a controlled or counterfeit 
substance with intent to distribute; to wit: Oxycodone. 
COUNT 2: DRIVING WITH MEASURABLE CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE IN THE BODY, a class B misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §41 -6a-517, as follows: That on or about June 29, 
2010, in Iron County, State of Utah, I did operate or was in actual 
physical control of a vehicle, and had any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in my body. 
C' J 
Initials 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed 
above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other 
persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my 
guilty pleas and prove the elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty: 
Initials 
000028 
I did, on or about June 29, 2010, in Iron County, State of Utah, knowingly and intentionally 
possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; to wit: Oxycodone; and I did 
operate or was in actual physical control of a vehicle, and had any measurable controlled substance 
or metabolite of a controlled substance in my body. 
Initials 
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the 
constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give up 
all the following rights: 
Initials 
1. Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might 
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service 
to me. 
Initials 
I have not waived my right to counsel; or if I have waived my right to counsel, I have done 
so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and after stating my reasons for doing so on the record. 
L A J _ 
Initials 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty. I also 
nnnn^ 
understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty plea. 
Initials 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is Jack B. Burns. My attorney and I 
have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty plea. 
Initials 
2. Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
Initials 
3. Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and b) my 
attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-examine 
all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
CO 
Initials 
4. Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses 
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those 
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs. 
Initials 
5. Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have 
a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf I also know that if I chose not to testify, 
no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that if I chose 
-4-
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not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Initials 
6. Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty (or 
no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crimes. 
If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for 
a trail. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charges beyond 
a reasonable doubt. If the trail is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each 
juror would have to find me guilty. 
Initials 
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be 
admitting that I committed the crimes stated above. 
uj 
Initials 
7. Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, 
I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to appeal 
my conviction if I plead guilty. I understand that if I wish to appeal my sentence I must file a notice 
of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is entered. 
Initials 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 




8. Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime 
to which I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory 
penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my 
sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. 
Initials 
I know that in addition to a fine, a ninety percent (90%) surcharge will be imposed. I also 
know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victims of my crimes, including any restitution 
that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
Initials 
9. Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the 
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead 
to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of 
which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea now may result in 
consecutive sentences being imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose 
consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences 
would be inappropriate. 
Initials 
10. Plea agreement. My guilty plea is the result of a plea agreement between myself and 
the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are 
fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
In exchange for rny plea of "guilty" to the offenses of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
t 
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second-Degree Felony; and DRIVING WITH 
-6-
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MEASURABLE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN THE BODY, a Class B Misdemeanor; the State 
has agreed to dismiss the remaining charges of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Class A Misdemeanor; and POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B Misdemeanor; and dismiss Criminal Case No. 101500414. 
Moreover, I understand that the State of Utah will be requesting the preparation of a Presentence 
Investigation Report prior to sentencing. I further understand that I will be ordered to pay restitution 
in Criminal Case No. 101500414 and I agree to do so. No other promises have been made to induce 
me to plead guilty. 
Initials 
11. Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on 
the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge may 
do are not binding on the judge. 
Initials 
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained 
in this statement have been made to me. 
uC 
Initials 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
-7-
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anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
Initials 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
Initials 
I am ^ - ^ years of age. I have attended school through the I \ grade. I can read and 
understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided 
to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, mediation, or intoxicants which would impair my 
judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, 
medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
Initials 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental disease, 
defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or from 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
LP 
Initials 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea, I must file a written motion or 
withdraw my plea before sentence is announced. I understand that for a plea held in 
abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be made within 30 days of 
pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show that it was 
not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge to my plea made after 
sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, 
and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
-8-




CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for LEVI WICKWARD, the defendant above, and I know he 
has read the statement, or that I have read it to him; and I discussed it with him and believe he fully 
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of 
my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime and the factual 
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and 
true. 
'JACK B. BURNS 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against LEVI WICKWARD, 
defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense is true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered defendant. The plea 
negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as 
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe the evidence 
-9-
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would support the conviction of defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered and 
acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest. 
ANN MARIE McIFF ALLEN 
Deputy Iron County Attorney 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representation in the court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty plea is freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty plea to the crimes set forth in the 
Statement be accepted and entered. 
DATED this / day of £ep£z~U*^
 ? 2010. 
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Next is the sentencing in State vs. Levi 
Mr. Burns? 
Yes, your Honor. 
All right, and I've 













Yes, your Honor. 
Okay, are you ready 
We are. 
Who's handling this 
EDWARDS: I am, your Honor. 
COURT: Mr. Edwards, do you 
sentencing in the case? 
MR. EDWARDS: Just ask that the 
received and I've read 
done that? 
to proceed with the 
for the State today? 
have a recommendation 
Court follow the 









the Court to 
Mr. Burns. 
Your Honor, we have -- we have reviewed 
both my client and I are aware of the 
would recommend an alternate sentence for 
consider. Your Honor, we think that Mr. Wickward 
should be given one 
probation. 
more opportunity to successfully complete 
We're asking that the Court sentence him to 270 days 
~3
~ 
1 in the Iron County Jail, with credit for time served. Then 
2 (inaudible) him the opportunity of probation in this case with 
3 standard probationary terms, including a fine. We do think a 
4 $1,500 fine is appropriate, along with the substance abuse 
5 evaluation and recommended treatment, Again, the standard 
6 terms that we'd normally see in this type of case if the 
7 recommendation were not prison. 
8 Mr. Wickward understands -- first, he has a relation-
9 ship with the probation officer who authored this PSI . He 
10 knows him. He understands -- he understands the recommendation 
11 and why he made the recommendation; but does believe that there 
12 is some more background that he'd like the Court to consider. 
13 That background -- and I will let him speak to that. 
14 He is more familiar and closer to it than I am; but in the 
15 case that he's currently on probation for, in which this 
16 would propose an order to show cause, he feels like he has 
17 progressively done better, and he is a better person today 
18 than when he was first placed on probation. That he "made 
19 substantial progress in probation in that case. I'll let him 
20 speak more toward that, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Wickward. 
22 MR. WICKWARD: Your Honor, yes, I have lived a very 
23 rough and unsettled life, being from childhood I was placed 
24 in a home where my parents were drug addicts. I have fought 
25 additions with alcohol, marijuana, methamphetamines, all those 
- 4 -
1 things; and your Honor, I admit, you know, for 16 years or 
2 longer I've done those drugs, and then I quit on my own accord, 
3 being a father. 
4 There's a lot of things in my life that I want to 
5 progress past and get out of that revolving door, so to speak. 
6 I want to do a better job and pay back, you know, more towards 
7 the community, along with my children, as well. You know, I 
8 want to prove myself to myself, to my family, to you, your 
9 Honor. 
10 I just -- excuse me for being nervous and trying to 
11 speak this clearly, but there's a lot of things in my life that 
12 I have lived through. I have gone through and ultimately, you 
13 know, there's things that I just want to get past behind me and 
14 do a better job for my children. I don't want my children to 
15 be a State -- you know, a burden to the State. I want them to 
16 be my responsibility in full. 
17 My daughter was viciously attacked in April by a pit 
18 bull in Hurricane at my neighbor's house, and I just --•I 
19 haven't been away from my kids this long ever. There's a lot 
20 of things that have gone really wrong in this last year for me. 
21 Prior to being put on probation, I was walking out of 
22 a store and I got hit by a vehicle. I suffered some medical 
23 injuries from that. I started going to school, was getting 
24 ready to obtain my high school diploma. Prior to that, I -- my 
25 daughter was injured. Just I've had a lot of challenges. 
-5-
1 In June, the one time I did relapse, I smoked marijuana 
2 one time, and I did, you know, admit to that to the probation 
3 officers that I would be dirty for it. However, I do have a 
4 valid prescription to these medications that I tested positive 
5 for, in which the State says that I didn't have, but I do. 
6 I'm sorry, I'm just really nervous and trying to speak 
7 this to you clearly; but I just want you to understand that I 
8 really do want to get this all put behind me. I want to finish 
,9 with school. I want to go to college so that I can become a 
10 youth counselor or advisor, so that I can maybe help children 
11 not live the life that I have, or suffer from the things that 
12 I have, without being able to speak forward and those kind of 
13 things. 
14 There's a lot of -- a lot of children in this world who 
15 deserve better chances and help than what I have received as 
16 a child. So I want to do better not only for my own children, 
17 but other people's as well. I'm really sorry, I'm just — I'm 
18 really nervous about trying to speak my heart to you "right now; 
19 but there's a lot of things I wish you could see through in my 
20 case and understand where I'm coming from. 
21 THE COURT: All right, thank you. Anything else from 
22 the State? 
23 MR. EDWARDS: Your Honor", I'll just point out for the 
24 Court that what the PSI contained, the defendant was being 
25 supervised in Washington State, where he had a number of 
-6-
1 violations including several dirty UA's. He absconded from 
2 that state. He was on bench probation in Washington City, when 
3 he committed new crimes. When he committed this offense, on 
4 the very same day he had a plea agreement on those new crimes. 
5 He admitted -- pled guilty to a second-degree felony. 
6 He also attempted to smuggle drugs into the jail and he damaged 
7 the jail once he was there. Based on this conduct and his 
8 prior convictions, your Honor, I would -- it would be my recom-
9 mendation that he be sentenced to prison in this case. I think 
10 that would be appropriate. 
11 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Mr. Burns? 
12 MR. BURNS: Your Honor, regarding -- first of all, 
13 regarding the statement as to conduct of smuggling drugs into 
14 the jail, that matter was charged as a separate charge. I was 
15 not appointed Counsel on that. It was Jeff Slack. However, I 
16 was present, because these cases were moving forward at the 
17 same time. 
18 Given -- given the facts of that case, and what Judge 
19 Walton indicated was his indication to probably not bind over, 
20 the State dismissed that count. I don't think that that is 
21 appropriately considered. 
22 As to the damage to jails matter, I do think that's 
23 appropriately considered. Mr. Wickward was in the facility. 
24 He was essentially -- well, not essentially. There was a lewd 
25 act. He Was flashed by another inmate, and he kicked -- there 
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1 was a door with a window. The window is on the bottom pane 
2 between he and the inmate. He kicked the window. It was not 
3 his intent to break the window. Rather, it was -- I guess like 
4 an attention gaining activity for the person on the other side. 
5 MR. WICKWARD: I was walking away from the door, your 
6 Honor. I just kind of tapped it with my foot^as I was walking 
7 away. I didn't try to kick it like I was going through it. 
8 It was a mere accident, and I admitted to the officer in the 
9 bubble at the time that I had done that. 
10 THE COURT: So you didn't break it? 
11 MR. WICKWARD: No, I broke it, but — 
12 THE COURT: Oh, by tapping it? 
13 MR. WICKWARD: By kicking it with my foot as I was 
14 walking away, and I admitted it to the officer, who didn't 
15 catch it. You know, I had to go tell him that I had broke 
16 this window, and I admitted it to the sergeant at the jail, 
17 the Iron County disciplinary hearing officer; and they charged 
18 me $38.36 for the window, being honest about it. So, 1 mean, 
19 it wasn't out of an act or anger or anything like that. 
20 I have completed drug treatment this last year. I've 
21 completed anger management, life skills. I'm going to school 
22 for my high school diploma so that I can further, you know, go 
23 into college to do better for myself. 
24 Tjie one thing I did, you know, I just -- I got kind 
25 of bound up in June, and messed up by relapsing one time m my 
year of being on probation. I had full --
MR. BURNS: As to the damage to the jail, that is 
-8-
a 
specific intent crime. We -- rather than proceed with that, 
it was wrapped up into this plea agreement and dismissed. 
PSI speaks to restitution and $38,36, and that not being 
to be governed by this case. 
Mr. Wickward would stipulate to the restitution 
ordered in this case, your Honor. We do think that that 
appropriate. 





MR. WICKWARD: One more thing. Being on probation in 
the State of Washington, I had moved down here to try and 
a home with my new family. My fiancee is from St. George 
I had told my probation officer in Washington State that 
done this. 
The reason why they're charging me with an absco 
is because I just haven't been able to pay all my full --
fines. That was it. I completed everything they wanted 
in the State of Washington, and then moved down here, rep 
my address. 
They put a warrant out for me. I turned myself 
that warrant; and just because I haven't been able to pay 











being thisi last year not being able to work due to my accident, 
it's just been rough. I really do want to prove myself, not 
only to myself, but to the communi 
involved. My children need me. 
THE COURT: State want to 
regard to this? 
MR. EDWARDS: Well, I don' 
surprising that there's an excuse 








any further with 
I just think it's 
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for everything, but there are 
EDWARDS: I — although there a 




COURT: Well, and the 
tppears to be an 
still think he deserves to 
difficult 








COURT: Have you successfully c 
WICKWARD: Your Honor, 





WICKWARD: I've just -
to getting everything 
in Washington County, and I caught 
prescription 
-- I really -
of my own medications 
I haven' 
- I've be 
done for 
y is that the PSI 
- successful on 
ompleted any 
t had an oppertuni 
en trying. I was 
this probation 
this charge for having a 
without 
ty 


























THE COURT: Well, the charge was possession 
to distribute. 
MR. WICKWARD: Yeah, I understand that. 
THE COURT: That's what you pled guilty to. 
-10-
with intent 
MR. WICKWARD: Yeah, I -- there was no way around it, 
I suppose. 
THE COURT: All right. All right, Mr. Levi Wickward, 
pursuant to your conviction of the crime of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second-degree 
felony, the Court sentences you to serve 1 to 15 years in the 
Utah State Prison and orders you to pay a $1,000 fine. That 
includes the 90 percent surcharge, plus a $33 Court 
fee. 
Pursuant to your conviction of trying to d] 
security 
rive with 
a measurable controlled substance in your body, a Class B 
misdemeanor, the Court sentences you to serve six months 
incarceration, no fine, and orders you to pay a $33 
security fee. That sentence is ordered to e served 
currently with Count I. 
I'm not going to place you on probation; I' 




of the Iron 
County Sheriff for transport to the Utah State Prison to serve 
that sentence. If you think I've made a mistake in 
you can appeal; and you do that by filing a written 
appeal to the Court within 30 days. 
this case, 
notice of 
- 1 1 -
1 The order should include a recommendation that the 
2 defendant be given credit for the -- according to the report, 
3 the 99 days that he's been incarcerated, waiting for resolution 
4 in this matter. That's all on your case today, Mr. Wickward. 
5 MR. WICKWARD: Your Honor, there's one thing. My cell 
6 phone is being held as evidence. It's got all, my family's 
7 contact information and everything I have not been able to 
8 get. If there's a way I could get, you know, just my contact 
9 information for my family and friends before I am shipped to 
10 prison, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Well, I don't -- I don't know what you want 
12 to do with regard to that. The --
13 MR. BURNS: Your Honor, if he can just go on record 
14 right now authorizing the release of that evidence to me after 
15 the 30 days have expired --
16 THE COURT: All right, because you have 30 days to file 
17 an appeal. If you file an appeal within that time frame, then 
18 obviously we need to make sure that we rec -- we keep evidence 
19 available in case that the Appellate Court determines that I've 
20 made a mistake and you get a new -- and I'm reversed on appeal 
21 and you get a new trial. Once that 30 days is expired, the 
22 State may -- maybe there's -- I don't know why you would want 
23 to keep the evidence, but --
24 I^ R. EDWARDS: I don't know why, either. 
25 MR. BURNS: Your Honor, there is a procedure we can 
-12-
follow to have that released. 
THE COURT: Right, okay. 
MR. BURNS: I just want Mr. Edwards to hear me get 
authorization from my client for that. I also have a written 
authorization right here. 
MR. WICKWARD: Yeah, and I do give authorization. 
THE COURT: All right. 




STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
ss . 
) 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the State of 
Utah, do hereby certify: 
That this proceeding was transcribed under my direction 
from the transmitter records made of these proceedings. 
That I have authorized Wendy Haws to prepare said 
transcript, as an independent contractor working under 
my license as a certified court reporter appropriately 
authorized under Utah statutes. 
That this transcript is full, true, correct, and contains 
all of the evidence and all matters to which the same related 
which were audible through said recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the outcome 
thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the record, and 
therefore, the name associated with the statement may not be 
the correct name as to the speaker. 
Wendy H^ws 
Certified Court Transcriber 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 21ST day of March 2011. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 2012 
Beve-fly Lowe 
NOTARY PUBLIC 





G. MICHAEL EDWARDS (#11563) 
Deputy Iron County Attorney 
82 North 100 East, Suite 201 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435)865-5310 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 





) JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, 
AND COMMITMENT 
) Criminal No. 101500382 
) Judge G. Michael Westfall 
The Defendant, LEVI WICKWARD, having entered a plea of guilty to the offenses of 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second-
Degree Felony; and DRIVING WITH MEASURABLE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN THE 
BODY, a Class B Misdemeanor; on September 1, 2010, and the Court having accepted said plea of 
guilty and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report, and after 
said report was prepared and presented to the Court, the above-entitled matter having come on for 
sentencing on October 5,2010, in Cedar City, Utah, and the Defendant, LEVI WICKWARD, having 
appeared in person, together with his attorney of record Jack B. Burns, and the State of Utah having 
appeared by and through\Deputy Iron County Attorney G. Michael Edwards, and the Court having 




OCT 2 5 2010 
5th DISTRICT G 
IRON COUN, 
DEPUTY CLERK 
statements from all parties, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters 
the following Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment as follows: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, LEVI 
WICKWARD, and pursuant to his plea of guilty, has been convicted of the offenses of 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second-
Degree Felony; and DRIVING WITH MEASURABLE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN THE 
BODY, a Class B Misdemeanor; and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything 
to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary 
being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and 
convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, LEVI WICKWARD, and pursuant to his 
conviction of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE, a Second-Degree Felony, shall serve a term of imprisonment for a period of one (1) 
to fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of 
the Utah Department of Corrections. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, LEVI WICKWARD, and pursuant to his 
conviction of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE, a Second-Degree Felony, shall pay a fine in the sum and amount of one thousand 
dollars ($ 1,000), including a ninety percent (90%) surcharge, and a court security fee in the sum and 
amount of thirty-three dollars ($33). 
- 2 -
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, LEVI WICKWARD, and pursuant to his 
conviction of DRIVING WITH MEASURABLE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN THE BODY, 
a Class B Misdemeanor, shall serve a term of imprisonment for a period not to exceed six (6) months 
in the Utah State Prison, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah Department 
of Corrections. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, LEVI WICKWARD, and pursuant to his 
conviction of DRIVING WITH MEASURABLE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN THE BODY, 
a Class B Misdemeanor, shall pay a court security fee in the sum and amount of thirty-three dollars 
($33). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentences imposed herein shall be served concurrently. 
IT IS ALSO RECOMMENDED that the Defendant receive credit for ninety-nine (99) days 
served in the Iron County Jail. 
COMMITMENT 
TO THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, LEVI WICKWARD, and 
deliver him to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and confined in accordance 
with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment. 
DATED this tfC~ day of October, 2010. 
000058 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, CAROLYN SMITHERMAN, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron 
County, State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and exact copy of the original 
Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Levi Wickward, 
Criminal No. 101500382, now on file and of record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah, 




District Clerk of Court 
•A V-. ^^m&tf ft By:. 
YIIWHOW ^ I J t e M ^ 
r - ' C T CO -^
5^0(JNTY 
District Deputy Clerk of Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid, on 
this day of October, 2010, to the following, to wit: 
Mr. JackB. Burns 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 1398 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-1398 
(AAxM^^ J <Crlt iA-"W-^ 
Assistant 
nnno5G 
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Deputy Iron County Attorney 
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Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435)865-5310 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
LEVI WICKWARD, ; 
Defendant. 
) .JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, 
AND COMMITMENT 
} Criminal No. 101500382 
) Judge G Michael Westfall 
The Defendant, LEVI WICKWARD, having entered a plea of guilty to the offenses of 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SI JBSTANCB WJTH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second-
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